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Recent Developments

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gussin

I

n Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Gussin, 350 Md. 552, 714
A.2d 188 (1998), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held the
accountant-client privilege not to
be absolute, but may generally be
waived by the client for third
parties to gain access to certain
types of confidential information.
In so holding, the court clarified
the nature of the privilege noting
that a client could waive the
privilege through conduct of his
. own or through certain disclosures
to third parties.
While not
expanding the accountant-client
privilege, the court nevertheless
reinforced the protection given
individuals against unintended
waiver of the privilege.
In August 1995, the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County
found that Paul Gussin ("Gus sin")
owed creditor Sears, Roebuck &
Co. ("Sears"), a judgment in the
amount of $36,031.46. In order to
enforce this judgment, Sears
sought discovery of Gussin's
financial records. Complying with
this request, Gussin produced his
1994 federal income tax return.
On his income tax return, filed
jointly with his wife Jocelyn,
Gussin reported $247,787.00 in
investment
income,
and
$161,000.00 in "other gains and
losses." Gussin testified that his
accountant, Ernst & Young, L.L.P.
of Baltimore ("E & Y"), prepared
his tax return and that any
documents revealing ownership of
his various investments would be
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likely to be kept with them. Aside
from the income reported on his
federal income tax return, Gussin
alleged that he did not own any
assets of significance, including
bank accounts or his residence.
His wife then testified that her
husband
had
received
approximately six million dollars
in the mid-1980's for his sale of a
one-third interest in their shoe
store business. When questioned
by Sears' counsel about his
ownership interest in these assets,
Gussin replied that he believed
Sears could better direct the
questions regarding the location of
his financial records to his
accountant, E & Y. Specifically,
Sears' counsel asked Gussin,
"Would Ernst & Young have the
papers also?" Gussin replied, "I
imagine. I don't know. They did
the tax return. You could ask

them." Thereafter, Sears served E
& Y with a subpoena at their
Baltimore office in order to obtain
discovery of Gussin's assets and
financial position.
The subpoena ordered the
accounting firm to designate a
representative to testify as to
particular documents which related
to Gussin's ownership interests in
the investments reported on his
1994 federal income tax return. E
& Y objected to the subpoena
asserting that the firm would
comply with the request only by
written court order. At a July 1997
hearing in the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County, Sears
responded to E & Y's objections
by arguing: (1) Gussin waived the
accountant-client privilege through
his responses at the deposition and
(2) Gussin made a fraudulent
conveyance of his records which
precluded him from relying on the
accountant-client privilege. Sears
did not contend that Gussin's
records were themselves not
privileged information.
The circuit court ruled that the
accountant-client privilege asserted
by Gussin had not been waived. In
response, Sears appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland granted certiorari on
its own motion prior to its review
by the intermediate appellate court.
The court of appeals reasoned
that, like other privileges, the
purpose of the accountant-client
privilege is to open the channels of
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communication between the
accountant and client. Sears, 350
Md. at 562, 714 A.2d at 193. The
privilege better enables the
accountant to perform his job and,
at the same time, protects the
client's expectation of privacy in
. various types of civil matters and
controversies. Id. (citing In re
Special Investigation No. 202, 53
Md. App. 96, 100,452 A.2d 458,
460 (1982).
Moreover, according to the
language of section 9-110, the
privilege against disclosure by a
licensed
certified
public
accountant of the contents of any
communication made by a client in
the
course
of
rendering
professional services, is "clear and
unambiguous." Id. at 563, 714
A.2d at 193 (citing MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 9-110
(Supp.1997)). Without express or
implied authorization from the
client or a valid waiver (i.e. waiver
by the client's disclosure to third
parties), client information remains
protected from disclosure. !d. at
565,
714
A.2d
at
194.
Accordingly, Gussin's statement
taken in the context of the
deposition was not intended to
divulge confidential documents or
any other information not required
to be disclosed by law. Id. The
court reasoned that Gussin's
statement, "you can ask them,"
while permitting Sears to inquire
as to the location of specific
documents, did not give E & Y
discretion to disclose the contents
of those documents. Id. at 564,
714 A.2d at 193. The court opined
that, generally, a party will not

waive the privilege simply "by
denying the opposing party's
accusations." Id. at 567, 714 A.2d
at 195. The court further stated
that "[m]erely 'being difficult'" is
not enough to justify waiver of the
privilege. Id. Moreover, nothing
in Gussin' s conduct suggested to
the court that he wished the
documents to be anything but
Id.
The court
confidential.
believed Gussin's statement was
"not in the nature of a disclosure
such that fairness would require
that the privilege cease." Id.
Finally, the court ruled that Sears
did not meet its burden of
establishing waVler of the
privilege.
In response to Sears' second
claim
of
the
fraudulent
conveyance, the court noted that
the facts did not support the
application of the exception. Id. at
569, 714 A.2d at 196. Therefore,
the court could not consider
whether a fraud exception would
be applicable to the accountantclient privilege. Id. In so doing,
the court held that evidence of
Gussin's previous assets were
insufficient to establish a basis for
fraud. Id. The fact that Gussin in
the past had millions of dollars in
assets alone, did not constitute the
requisite prima facie showing of
fraud. Id.
The court also did not consider
whether the actual documents in E
& Y's possession could be
protected. Id. at 570, 714 A.2d at
196. Neither Gussin nor Sears
ever raised the issue, rather both
sides focused on whether the
protection itself was actually

waived. Id. The court did note, in
important dicta, that "a client may
not
immunize
otherwise
discoverable material from the
reach of another party by
transferring possession of those
materials to an accountant." Id.
While accountants may hail the
court's decision as buttressing the
accountant-client privilege, a
closer examination of the decision
reveals this not to be entirely
accurate. In fact, as a point of
emphasis and clarification, the
court opted to specifically address
the argument put forth by E & Y -that the privilege could be waived
solely by express permission. The
court
concluded
that
this
interpretation was not only
erroneous, but neither supported
by law nor policy. As such, the
court refused to elevate the
privilege to a higher status than
most other privileges in the state
(i.e. attorney-client, doctor-patient)
which may be waived by the
client's conduct. It is the court's
view that the General Assembly
did not intend such a result by
enacting section 9-110. The court
supported its assertion by noting
that section 9-11 O(b) provides that
the privilege itself does not affect
such domains as the bankruptcy
laws and criminal laws or a
regulatory proceeding by the
Public Accountancy Board. While
the court did not rule on the
question of protection of the actual
documents, court dicta implied that
these papers would not be
immunized from discovery.
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